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Abstract: The first part of this paper discusses the relative mer-
its of Russell’s and Strawson’s view on the proper treatment of
descriptive phrases. I argue that Russell’s account is in princi-
ple correct, but is incomplete as it stands. The theory should be
extended with an account of the intuition that gave rise to Straw-
son’s (and Frege’s) alternative in the first place. In the second
part of this paper I present such an account in the ‘presupposi-
tion as anaphora’ framework. I show that if we treat Russellian
descriptions as anaphoric expressions and when we implement
such an account in a dynamic framework distinguishing between
input and output contexts, his basic claim, definites should not
be analysed as referring but as descriptive phrases, can be main-
tained while simultaneously accounting for the Frege/Strawson
intuition.
Key-words: Anaphora. Discourse representation theory. Dy-
namic interpretation. Presupposition. Theory of descriptions.
The truth of the matter . . . is that Russell’s analysis is correct,
but needs to be supplemented by an account of the conventions
relating to the dynamics of discussion or argument . . . (Wilfred
Sellars 1954, p. 207)
0∗I would like to thank Daniel Vanderveken for commenting on the talk on
which this paper is based, Bart Geurts and Tonny Hurkens for useful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Marie-Jose´ van den Hout for her
painstaking correction of the manuscript.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1905 Bertand Russell launched his famous theory of descrip-
tions, thereby fertilising philosophy with the highly influential idea
that the grammatical form of natural language sentences may dif-
fer significantly from their underlying logical form.1 According to
this theory, the logical form of a sentence like ‘The present queen
of the Netherlands wears a wig’ does not contain a constituent
corresponding to the grammatical subject; the underlying form
is a quantificational construct which is true just in case there is,
presently, a queen of the Netherlands, there is just one, and this
individual wears a wig. If one of these conditions is not met, the
sentence is false. Thus, the descriptive phrase ‘the present queen of
the Netherlands’ is not to be analysed as a singular term requiring
a reference object for the sentence that contains them to have a
truth-value. This runs counter to the views of Frege (1892) and
Strawson (1950, 1952), who analyse such expressions as singular
terms and have it that a sentence lacks a truthvalue in case the
grammatical subject has no reference.
In the language of Principia Mathematica a descriptive phrase
is rendered as an expression of the form ιxϕ, where ιx is the
description operator and ϕ, its body, an arbitrary formula. The
description-sign ιcomes, just like a quantifier, with a variable,
which serves to bind further variables in its scope; and just like
a quantifier the description-operator takes a formula. But unlike
quantifiers, the result of prefixing the description operator to a for-
mula does not yield a formula but a term. In the logical language
a description may thus occur in any position where we might also
find an individual constant. This term forming procedure gives us
1Of course, the idea that grammatical and logical form don’t coincide is a
direct consequence of Frege’s discovery of quantifiers, which antedates Russell’s
work with more than 20 years. It was Russell, however, who – by developing
and promoting his theory of descriptions – formulated the idea in an much more
explicit form and deeply influenced analytical philosophy for years to come.
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terms of arbitrary complexity. For, since the material in the body
of the description is a formula, we may exploit the full power of
predicate logic to encode the internal structure of a descriptive
phrase. This allows for descriptive phrases like e.g. (1),
(1) a. the boy who danced with all girls
b. ιx[boy(x) ∧ ∀y[girl(y)→ dance(x, y)]]
where we find a quantified construction in the body of the de-
scription. It also allows for embedding of descriptions inside other
descriptions as in (2),
(2) a. the man who honoured the queen
b. ιx[man(x) ∧ honour(x, ιy queen(y)]
and, most importantly, it respects the fact that – in natural lan-
guage – descriptive phrases may contain pronouns which can link
up to external antecedents of any type. An example is (3a), where
the pronominal his depends on the quantified phrase every boy.
The logical representation reflects this, since the description con-
tains a variable which is locally free and bound by the universal
quantifier.
(3) a. Every boy kissed the girl who loved him.
b. ∀x[boy(x)→ kiss(x, ιy[girl(y) ∧ love(y, x)]]
The expressive power of the language of descriptions thus goes way
beyond the paradigm cases featuring the present king of France, a
merit of Russell’s theory that has been extensively been discussed
by Mates (1973) and Neale (1990).
On Russell’s account the ι−operator is not part of the offi-
cial language. There is consequently no semantic definition of this
operator and descriptions have no meaning in isolation. Russell’s
definitions allow us, however, to translate any sentence which con-
tains one or more descriptions, into a description free formula.
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Thus (1b) and (2b) have no interpretation unless they are part of a
full sentence, and (3b) gets its interpretation indirectly by a trans-
lation in a description free predicate logic. The truth conditions of
(3b) are just those that the standard semantics of predicate logic
assigns to (4):
(4) ∀x[boy(x)→ ∃y[∀z[[girl(z)∧love(z, x)]↔ z = y]∧kiss(x, y)]]
The original constructs can best be seen as providing convenient
abbreviations for complex – description free – formulas. And the in-
terpretation of the former is given by the semantics of their de-
scription free expansions.
In the source language descriptions may occur in the scope of
any operator. In such environments the unexpanded version will
normally be ambiguous as to the scope of the description and the
embedding operators. Thus, without any further indication as to
the scope of a description, this gives us underspecified structures
that may be expanded in various ways. (5) for example is two way
ambiguous and may be rewritten to either (6a) or (6b):
(5) ¬ bald ιx kf(x)
(6) a. ¬∃x[∀y[kf(y)↔ y = x] ∧ bald(x)]
b. ∃x[∀y[kf(y)↔ y = x] ∧ ¬bald(x)]
And (7b) where we find yet another embedding, is three way am-
biguous. It may be expanded to either (8a), (8b), or (8c):
(7) a. If baldness is curable, the king of France is not bald.
b. curable → ¬ bald ιx kf(x)
(8) a. curable → ¬∃x[∀y[kf(y)↔ y = x] ∧ bald(x)]
b. curable → ∃x[∀y[kf(y)↔ y = x] ∧ ¬bald(x)]
c. ∃y[∀x[kf(x)↔ x = y] ∧ [curable → ¬bald(x)]]
To avoid ambiguous expression in the source language Russell in-
troduces scope indicators to mark the relative scope of a descrip-
tion. The description is marked (here by enclosing it in braces)
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and may be recopied to the left of any subformula that contains
the description. Thus (9a) abbreviates (6a) and (9b) abbreviates
(6b):
(9) a. ¬{ ιx kf(x)} bald ιx kf(x)
b. { ιx kf(x)}¬ bald ιx kf(x)
And (10a), (10b) and (10c) similarly abbreviate (8a), (8b) and
(8c):
(10) a. curable → ¬{ ιx kf(x)} bald ιx kf(x)
b. curable → { ιx kf(x)}¬ bald ιx kf(x)
c. { ιx kf(x)}[curable → ¬ bald ιx kf(x)]
If the description outscopes the full formula – as in (9b) and (10c) –
it is said to have primary occurrence, otherwise the occurrence is
called secondary.
The famous definitions are *14.01 and *14.02 of Whitehead
and Russell’s Principia Mathematica (1910). The first allows us
to translate a formula ψ which contains a description ιxϕ to a
formula from which the description is eliminated. *14.02 does a
similar job for existential sentences (in the description language
the symbol E! translates ‘exists’). In modern notation their defi-
nitions run as follows:2
*14.01 { ιx F (x)}G ιxF (x) =def ∃x[∀y[F (y)↔ y = x]∧G(x)]
*14.02 E! ιx F (x) =def ∃x∀y[F (y)↔ y = x]
By applying *14.01 and *14.02 until each description has been
eliminated we may translate the formulas of the description lan-
guage into standard description free predicate logic. Assuming that
the scope of each description has been indicated in advance the
2Or, more precise and general:
*14.01 [ ιxϕ/z]ψ =def ∃z[∀x[ϕ↔ x = z] ∧ ψ]
*14.01 E! ιxϕ =def ∃z∀x[ϕ↔ x = z]
provided that ιxϕ is free for z in ϕ.
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description language so gets, albeit indirectly, a non-ambiguous
interpretation.
2. THE PRESUPPOSITIONALIST ATTACK
Strawson (1950, 1952) (followed by Searle (1969) and many
others) famously attacked Russell on two counts. One line of attack
concerns the way descriptions are used, the other their semantics.
The basis of the first line of attack is the distinction between
(i) the use of an expression to refer uniquely, and (ii) the assertion
that there is a unique individual that satisfies certain properties.
The argument comes in various forms. A typical version runs as
follows. When uttering ‘The king of France is wise’ we typically
perform the speech act of assertion. And, in doing so, we use the
description to refer to a certain person and we assert of this per-
son that he is wise. The assertion that the person referred to is
wise thus depends on a prior act of reference. This conflicts with
the Russell’s analysis who – according to Strawson –would be com-
mitted to the claim that ‘. . . anyone who utters the sentence [The
King of France is wise] would be jointly asserting [my italics] three
propositions . . . ’ (Strawson 1950, p. 324). Most importantly, part
of what he asserts would be that there is a unique king of France.
Russell thus confuses ‘(1) using an expression to make unique ref-
erence; and (2) asserting that there is one and only one individual
which has certain characteristics.’ (ibid., p. 334).
Though – as far as the pragmatics of descriptions goes – the ar-
gument has a certain intuitive appeal, it suffers from an unfortu-
nate ambiguity in the notion of ‘statement’. Throughout his ar-
gument Strawson uses the expressions ‘statement’ and ‘assertion’
interchangeably. As to his notion of ‘statement’ Strawson stresses
that ‘statements’ and not sentences are the bearers of truth-values.
What statement is made by a particular use of a sentence depends
on the context of utterance. In different contexts one and the same
sentence can be used to make different statements – and it depends
on the context whether the statement that ensues is true or false.
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This, of course, typically holds for Russell’s paradigm example fea-
turing the indexical phrase ‘the present king of France’: Russell’s
example could have been true if uttered two centuries ago, but
not when uttered in Russell’s or Strawson’s time, a fact Russell
wholeheartedly agrees with.
According to this explication, Strawson anticipates the view
of authors like Stalnaker (1970) and Kaplan (1989) who conceive
of linguistic meaning as a function from contexts to propositions.
Strawson’s conception of statement then corresponds to what these
authors call the ‘proposition’ expressed or the ‘content’ of what is
said. It should be pointed out, however, that the notion of state-
ment as an explication of the Kaplan/Stalnaker notion of content
should be distinguished sharply from ‘assertion’, which is a no-
tion of speech act theory. Now it is generally held that proposi-
tions are the contents of assertoric speech acts. Accordingly we
may interpret Strawson as claiming that not sentences but state-
ments qualify as the objects of assertoric speech acts. Interpreted
this way the above version of Strawson’s argument loses its force
against the original Russellian analysis. Russell’s central claim is
not that we assert (in the sense of speech act theory) that there
is a unique descriptum, his claim is a much more modest one: sen-
tences containing descriptions are truthconditionally equivalent to
the quantificational expansions from which the descriptions have
been eliminated. Or, taking the character/content distinction into
account and rephrased in the terminology of propositions or con-
tents, his claim is that the content of an utterance made in a
particular context is equivalent to the content of what would, in
the same context (!), be expressed by the expansion from which
the description is eliminated.3 Russell’s theory as stated in Russell
3In his reply to Strawson, Russell (1959, p. 176) points out that by sub-
stituting 1905 for the indexical ‘present’ in the phrase ‘the present king of
France Strawson’s argument technically collapses. See also Sellars (1954),
Mates (1973) and Neale (1990) for further discussion that the question index-
icality (or egocentricity as Russell would call it) is independent of the point
Strawson wants to establish.
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(1905, 1910) is fully independent of the speech act notion of asser-
tion.4 Of course, in many contexts it may for various reasons be
infelicitous or inappropriate to utter the natural language trans-
lation of the Russellian expansion. This, however, is independent
of the issue of truthconditional content. Clearly, sentences may
be true or false quite independently of their being ‘infelicitous’,
‘inappropriate’ or ‘confusing’. As far as the pragmatic line of at-
tack goes Strawson’s argument mainly establishes that Russell’s
account is incomplete as it stands, not that it is wrong.
As to the semantics the central issue is whether descriptions
are to be analysed as referring expressions or names in the classic
Fregean sense. A sentence containing a referring expression does
neither for Frege nor for Russell express the proposition that there
is some object that has a particular property. For such a sentence
to have an interpretation it is required that the referring expression
pick out some object and, only if it does, we may check for the
relevant property whether it holds of this object. Frege moreover
insists that the reference of a complex expression is a function of
the references of its parts. It follows that, if one component lacks a
reference, the whole expression will lack a reference. Coupled with
his doctrine that the reference of a sentence is its truth value, it
follows that no sentence in which a non-referring expression figures
as a part can have a truth value.
This way the category of sentences which are not true is split
up into two distinct subclasses: sentences which are false and sen-
tences which are neither true or false. Now I won’t dispute that
the claim that such a sentence does not have a truth value is de-
fensible for the simple paradigm examples like ‘The king of France
is wise’. But postulating this special class of non-true sentences
by splitting up non-truth in falsity and lack of a truth value, is
not a decision which can be made by observing that people are
4See Russell’s remarks on assertion and the assertion sign in Principia
Mathematica (1910, p. 92), where Russell – following Frege – carefully distin-
guishes between asserting a proposition and putting it forward for mere con-
sideration.
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somehow reluctant in calling a sentence false if it is for some rea-
son inappropriate or infelicitous to utter. Such a decision should
be motivated on theoretical grounds, e.g. by showing that a phe-
nomenon to be explained can be more adequately captured when
we extend our semantic ontology this way. If not, calling sentence
truthvalueless instead of false boils down to a mere terminological
issue. Unfortunately, the claim that sentences with non-denoting
grammatical subjects lack a truth value, does give rise to unpalat-
able consequences when we consider them as parts of extensional
compounds. Reference failure is infectious. If one of the compo-
nent sentences of a complex sentence lacks a value, any compound
in which it figures as a part will lack a value as well. But now
the Frege/Strawson position is in serious trouble. Obviously all of
the following sentences have a determinate value even though they
contain a component sentence that suffers from reference failure
(and thus lacks a truth value).
(11) a. France has a king and the king of France is bald.
b. If France has a king, the king of France is bald.
c. Either France does not have a king or the king of
France is bald.
A straighforward application of the Frege/Strawson theory pre-
dicts that all these sentences will lack a truth value (and also
wrongly predicts that they carry the presupposition that there is
a king of France).5 However, for a Russellian (11a) through (11c)
5I hasten to add that this holds for a straightforward application of the
Frege/Strawson ideas. Frege also considers a second strategy: restore defined-
ness by assigning a null-object to all terms that suffer from reference failure.
This unfortunately predicts that presuppositions never survive under embed-
ding. I morever add that, following Strawson, various authors have developed
three-valued or other non-standard logics which enable us to block the pre-
suppositional inferences in some embedded environments, while leaving them
intact in others. However as the literature on presupposition projection has
made abundantly clear, none of these strategies is able to cope with the full
set of relevant data. See the discussions and overviews in Gazdar (1979), Van
der Sandt (1988) and Beaver (2001)
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raise no problems. Given the fact that there is no king of France
(11a) is predicted to be false and (11b) and (11c) are predicted to
be true.
There is a second, and equally serious, set of problems for
the view that descriptions are referring expressions. As we saw,
descriptions may be complex and encode any amount of descriptive
information. And, most importantly, descriptions may contain free
variables which can be bound by external quantifiers. We already
saw an example in (3). (12a) and (12b) are two other examples.
(12) a. Someone had a dog and his dog was frightened.
b. If a man gets angry, his dog gets frightened.
In all these cases we encounter in the description a pronoun which
depends on an external antecedent. Again, this is not a problem
for the Russellian. In ιy [girl(y)∧ love(y, x)], the Russellian encod-
ing of the descriptive phrase in (3), we encounter a free variable
which is bound by the universal quantifier. We observe the same
phenomenon in (12a) and (12b). Here the pronoun his emerges
as a variable which is free in the description and gets its value
from the quantifiers in respectively the first conjunct in (12a) and
the antecedent of the conditional in (12b). It is a problem for
the Strawsonian, though. For in none of these cases there is an
uniquely identifiable object on which the description depends and
this precludes the possibility to analyse these phrases as referring
expressions.
We have to conclude that Strawson’s criticism of Russell is
wanting and, as it stands, Russell’s theory has a clear technical
advantage. This does not alter the fact that the intuitions that
gave rise to the Frege/Strawson view in the first place, are correct
and should be accounted for in one way or another. For clearly, if a
speaker utters a sentence like ‘The present king of France is (not)
bald’ he will assume that there is such a person and assert (in the
speech act sense of the word) that the person referred to is bald.
Thus, if we don’t limit ourselves merely to the truthconditional
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analysis of the description language, but look at the functioning
of descriptive phrases in a larger discourse we encounter the cen-
tral drawback of Russell’s analysis: it is incomplete as it stands.
Consider the classic examples of Karttunen and Stalnaker:
(13) a. The king of France is bald.
b. France has a king and the king of France is bald.
c. The king of France is bald and France has a king.
On a Russellian account (13a), (13b) and (13c) have the same
truth conditions. They do have a different function in discourse
though. (13a) will typically be uttered in a context or discourse
which implicitly or explicitly contains an individual that satisfies
the descriptive material. A felicitous utterance of (13b) requires
a context which does not already contain such an individual, and
(13c) is not admissible in any context. Note finally that the use
of the full descriptive phrase in (13b) has an air of redundancy.
It rather functions as a pronoun taking up the individual that
has been introduced in the first conjunct. We observe the same
phenomenon in a larger discourse. In the second sentence in (14a)
the pronoun functions as a scantly dressed version of the full de-
scriptive phrase, and it has, when interpreted in a context which
contains a salient individual that is king of France, exactly the
same interpretation as its non-pronominal counterpart:
(14) a. France has a king . . .
. . . He is bald.
b. France has a king . . .
. . . The king of France is bald.
At face value the Russellian account and the Frege/Strawson
view seem diametrically opposed. One might surmise (with Sellars
(1954) and many others) that they may be reconciled by inter-
preting Russell’s account as an account of truth-conditional con-
tent while simultaneously reinterpreting Strawson’s basic intuition
as pertaining to the ‘pragmatics of communication’. However, the
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fact that the descriptive phrases in (13b) and (14b) function in
exactly the same way as as the pronoun in (14a) suggests that this
is not something that is easily achieved in a standard semantics.
For, just like the pronoun in (14a), the descriptive phrase in (14b)
is in a sense ‘contextually bound’ by an antecedent that has been
introduced just before.
To account for the function of such sentences Russell’s theory
has to be supplemented with an account of the dynamics of dis-
course. A proper account along these lines had to wait until the
advent of discourse representation theory and other dynamic theo-
ries of interpretation. In the next section I won’t treat descriptions
as denoting; I won’t treat them as referential expressions either. In-
stead I will treat them essentially as descriptively laden anaphors.
It will then turn out that if we abandon the static classic view
of meaning and adopt a dynamic and representational framework,
Russell’s basic analysis of descriptions can be reinstated while si-
multaneously accounting for Frege’s and Strawson’s intuitions.
3. PRESUPPOSITIONAL DRT
Construction and resolution of Discourse Representation
Structures
Discourse representation theory (DRT), as developed by Kamp
(1981) and Kamp and Reyle (1993), belongs to a family of theories
that focus on the interpretation of coherent stretches of discourse
instead of sentences in isolation.
The basic idea is the following. Natural language utterances
are interpreted sequentially and they are interpreted in a con-
tinually evolving discourse. In the course of this interpretation
process the hearer constructs a representation of the discourse in-
terpreted thus far and, while the discourse unfolds, he incorporates
the information provided by each subsequent sentence in the al-
ready established representation structure. This respects the fact
that the interpretation of sentence may depend on information
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that is given in the context of utterance and the preceding dis-
course. Context dependence is particularly obvious when sentences
contain anaphoric elements. Pronouns are a typical example, but
anaphoricity is all pervasive. Quantifiers, modals and tenses are,
just as pronouns, examples of linguistic elements which depend
for their interpretation on a previously established universe. As
to pronouns, we already saw that they may find their antecedent
sentence internally as in e.g. (12), or in a previously established
discourse as in (14a). And, when discussing (14b), we noted that
substituting the descriptive phrase ‘the king of France’ for the pro-
noun does not alter the interpretation of this mini-discourse. Def-
inite descriptions function in discourse as anaphoric expressions
just as pronouns.6
The account given below will be formulated in a presupposi-
tional extension of Discourse Representation Theory. I will limit
myself to a rough outline and refer the reader for detailed exposi-
tions to the work of Kamp (1981) and Kamp & Reyle (1993), and
for the presuppositional extension to Van der Sandt (1992) and
Geurts (1999).
The central notion is that of a Discourse Representation Struc-
ture (DRS). DRS’s are representation structures consisting of a set
of discourse markers and a set of conditions. Discourse markers are
objects that are introduced while the discourse proceeds. Condi-
tions come in various kinds. The simplest are the so-called atomic
conditions. They encode the descriptive information that is as-
signed to discourse markers: discourse markers acquire and collect
information in the course of a conversation.
Formally, a DRSK consists of an ordered pair 〈U(K), Con(K)〉,
where U(K), the universe of K, is a set of discourse referents and
Con(K) is a set of conditions. Processing the first sentence of (15)
yields an example of such a representation structure:
6See in particular Heim (1982) and much work in the AI tradition.
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(15) a. France has a king.
b. He is bald.
The representation for (15a) comes out as (16):
(16)
[
x
kf(x)]
The indefinite NP a king introduces a discourse marker into the
universe of the DRS, which will figure as the referent for this NP
for the remainder of the discourse. The descriptive information is
encoded in the condition kf(x). The semantics of DRT tells us that
this DRS is true in a model M if there is a function f such that
it maps the discourse marker x onto entities in the domain of M
in such a way that f(x) has the property of being king of France.
The semantics thus assigns exactly the same truthconditions to
the DRS (16) as the standard semantics of predicate logic assigns
to (17):
(17) ∃x kf(x)
There is a crucial difference, though. Unlike predicate logic DRT
does not represent the indefinite article by an existential quantifier
but by a free variable, and this variable gets its existential import
indirectly from the truth definition, which requires that there be a
function that verifies the DRS in the model.
When processing (16b) we encounter another novelty. Pro-
nouns (and other anaphoric expressions) come, in contrast to in-
definites, with a special instruction: they should link up to a previ-
ously established discourse referent. This is indicated by encoding
them as a special type of condition which is itself constructed
out of a DRS consisting of the anaphoric variable and a possibly
empty set of condition: ∂
[
y
. . .]. I will refer to such conditions
as anaphoric conditions and to the argument of the ∂-operator as
a presuppositional frame (the rationale behind the latter locution
will become clear later, when we treat definite descriptions – and
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presupposition inducers in general – as anaphoric expressions). The
encoding as a condition which introduces a DRS, may seem otiose
for regular pronouns which lack syntactic structure and come with
minimal descriptive content (they are marked at most for number
and gender). But, as to representation of descriptions, I already
pointed out that we need the full power of logical language. The
syntactic complexity of non-pronominal anaphors is conveniently
captured in a ∂-condition. For, firstly, the anaphoric variable of
a ∂-condition may be embellished by any number of (atomic)
conditions; secondly, ∂-conditions may embed further anaphoric
expressions, which will thus figure as conditions in their embed-
der; and, finally, such anaphoric conditions may contain variables
that are free in this condition and thus may link up to an exter-
nal antecedent. This allows for the encoding of presuppositional
anaphors of any complexity.
But let me limit myself to pronouns for the moment. Adding
both the anaphoric condition and the condition bald(x) gives the
following DRS for (15b):
(18)
[ bald(y),∂ [y  ]
]
We now merge (18) with the DRS for the incoming context, i.e.
with (16), the DRS constructed for (15a). This merge is a simple
operation which delivers a new DRS the universe of which con-
sist of the union of the universes of the DRS’s to be merged and
similarly for its set of conditions.
(19)
[
x
kf(x)]⊕ [ bald(y),∂ [y  ]
]
=
[
x
kf(x), bald(y),∂ [y  ]
]
It is important to see that the resulting DRS is a preliminary con-
struct in the sense that the anaphoric elements (in the present
case just ∂
[
y
 ], the representation of the pronoun) are yet un-
resolved. Processing the anaphoric conditons is the task of the
second module, the resolution algorithm. It links the anaphoric
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variables in ∂-conditions to their antecedents. In the present case
this is simple. We resolve the anaphoric condition by equating the
anaphoric variable y with x.
(20)
[
x
kf(x), bald(y),∂ [y  ]
]
 
[
x, y
kf(x), bald(y),x = y
]
The result, which comes out in simplified form as
[
x
kf(x), bald(x)]
does not contain any anaphoric condition. It is a resolved DRS to
which the standard truth definition of DRT applies. This DRS
is true in a model M just in case there is an embedding of this
structure intoM such that f(x) is in the domain ofM and f(x) has
both the property of being king of France and of being bald. The
output of the resolution process thus has the same truth conditions
as the representation of the full discourse in predicate logic:
(21) ∃x [kf(x) ∧ bald(x)]
But note that the standard (static) truth conditions only apply
to the outcome of the resolution process: they capture the inter-
pretation of the full discourse, not of isolated sentences. In this
respect the notion of meaning is crucially different. DRT is a dy-
namic theory of meaning. The meaning of individual sentences is
located in the change that results from interpreting a sentence in
a discourse: it is a function from DRS’s to DRS’s; or, put differ-
ently, the meaning of a sentence is located in its context change
potential.
In the version of DRT sketched above, processing of sentences
in a discourse is essentially a two-step procedure, consisting of
a construction and a resolution algorithm. In the first stage, the
syntactic component builds preliminary DRS’s and merges these
constructs with the DRS that encodes the incoming context. Then
there is the resolution algorithm. This mechanism takes care of the
resolution of anaphoric expressions. In the resolution process we
find the two major innovations of presuppositional DRT. It takes
care of disambiguation in case an anaphoric expression has the
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choice between different antecedents; and, as we will discuss in
detail in the next section, it functions as a mechanism that deter-
mines the relative scope of definite descriptions and other presup-
position inducers with respect to embedding operators. The reso-
lution process is crucially guided by pragmatic principles, which
are partially Gricean in nature, thus giving rise to an integrated
theory of semantic and pragmatic interpretation.
DRS’s need not be as simple as the example given. Logical
connectives, operators and various types of quantifiers yield, just
as ∂-conditions, complex conditions, that is conditions which are
themselves constructed out of DRS’s. Thus, if K is a DRS, ¬K,
K, ♦K, K1∨K2, K1 → K2 are complex conditions. When these
conditions are part of a DRS, we perceive a hierarchical structure
where DRS’s are embedded in other DRS’s. Complex conditions
create subDRS’s in the DRS that contains them. For example, the
construction of the negated ‘He is not bald’ yields (22a). Process-
ing proceeds as before. The provisional DRS for (22a) will be
merged with incoming context, and the result of the merge will,
by equating the anaphoric variable y with the already established
marker x, resolve as in (22b):
(22) a.
[ ¬ [bald(y),∂ [y  ]
]]
b.
x

kf(x),
¬
[bald(y),∂ [y  ]
] [x kf(x),¬ [ bald(x)]
]
Binary connectives introduce two sub-DRS’s, in the case of a con-
ditional one for the antecedent and one for the consequent. The
preliminary DRS constructed for (23a) thus comes out as (23b).
(23) a. If France has a king, he is bald.
b.
[[xkf(x)]→ [bald(y),∂ [y  ]
]]
c.
[ [xkf(x)]→ [ bald(x)]]
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The anaphoric variable will link up to the marker in the repre-
sentation of the antecedent, thus resolving the full structure to
(23c). The truth definition tells us that this DRS is true just in
case every function f that verifies the antecedent can be extended
to a function that also verifies the consequent. Again, this yields
the same truth conditions as would be assigned to (24) on their
standard translation into predicate logic:
(24) ∀x[kf(x)→ bald(x)]
The last example illustrates another, central, feature of DRT.
Whether or not ‘donkey anaphora’ is involved, indefinites are al-
ways represented in the same way: they introduce a discourse ref-
erent in the DRS where they syntactically originate. However, if
indefinites bind pronouns or other anaphors in the consequent of a
conditional, they acquire universal quantificational force; and this
happens as a result of the truth definition, which requires that
every embedding that verifies the antecedent can be extended to a
verifying embedding of the consequent. As in the case of sequences
of sentences we are able to semantically extend the scope of dis-
course referents to positions that cannot be accessed in standard
static theories.
Quantifiers like ‘every’, ‘no’, and ‘most’ create so-called du-
plex conditions. Duplex conditions mimic generalised quantifiers.
A duplex condition consists of three parts: the quantifier Q with
the variable quantified over and two DRS’s. The leftmost DRS is
called the restrictor, the DRS on the right of the quantifier its
nuclear scope. The preliminary DRS for (25) comes out as (26).
(25) Most countries which have a queen, honour her.
(26)
[[x, y country(x), queen(y),poss(x, y)
] 〈MOST
x
〉 [honour(x, z),∂ [z  ]
]]
Manuscrito - Rev. Int. Fil., Campinas, v. 29, n. 2, pp. 399-436, jul.-dez. 2006.
PROCESSING DESCRIPTIONS 417
The anaphoric variable z links up to y yielding
(27)
[[x, y country(x), queen(y),poss(x, y)
] 〈MOST
x
〉 [honour(x, y)]]
The truth conditions are as expected: for most x which satisfy the
conditions on the left it holds that they satisfy the conditions on
the right. Note that only the x is quantified. The quantificational
force of the indefinite remains unaffected.
This leaves me with the notions of subordination and acces-
sibility. Subordination is a configurational notion. Embedding a
DRS in another DRS gives rise to subordination of the former
to the latter. Thus in (22a) the negated structure is subordinate
to the main DRS, in (23b) both the antecedent and the conse-
quent structure are subordinate to the main DRS, and the same
holds in (26) for the restrictor and the nuclear scope of the du-
plex condition. Subordination constrains which discourse referents
qualify as antecedents of the anaphoric elements as encoded in the
∂-conditions. It is the basis for the definition of accessibility. A
discourse referent is accessible to a variable in a ∂-condition in
two cases. Firstly, if it is in the universe of a superordinate struc-
ture; and, secondly, anaphoric variables in the consequent of a
conditional can access discourse referents in the universe of its
antecedent. The same holds for duplex conditions: the anaphoric
variables in the nuclear scope of a duplex condition have access
to discourse referents in the universe of the restrictor. Since ac-
cessibility is a transitive relation this creates an accessibility path
for the anaphoric variables in ∂-conditions. They may look up-
ward through discourse structures, they may moreover look from
the consequent of a conditional into its antecedent (and similarly,
with duplex conditions, from the scope into the restrictor), but
they cannot look downwards. In the following diagram the acces-
sibility path for discourse referent x4 is 3–2–1 and the accessibility
path for x6 is 5–2–1.
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(28)
x1

1.x2

2.
¬
x3

3.
∂
[
x4
 ]

〈Qx2〉
x5

5.
∂
[
x6
 ]


Thus x4 has access to x1, x2 and x3, and x6 has access to x1, x2
and x5. However, x4 cannot access x5 (we cannot look from the
restrictor into the nuclear scope) nor can x6 access x3 (since it is
in a DRS that is subordinated to DRS2 and thus not on its ac-
cessibility path). This correctly predicts that the pronoun in the
second sentence of (29a) may link up to the discourse referent cre-
ated for the indefinite in the first sentence, but that no anaphoric
connection can be made in (29b).
(29) a. France has a king. He is not bald.
b. France does not have a king. He is bald.
In the latter case the discourse referent for the pronoun is intro-
duced at a subordinate level and thus not accessible. In this case
the resolution algorithm will thus come to a halt, no resolved DRS
will come about and the discourse will consequently lack an inter-
pretation.
Binding and accommodation of presuppositional expres-
sions
According to the standard theories of presupposition, presup-
positional information is information that is taken for granted by
the participants in a discourse or a conversation. As such it has
a different status from the information the participants intend to
present as new or relevant. For example, by his use (30) a speaker
typically indicates that he takes for granted that the Netherlands
has a queen, and by the same sentence he conveys that she wears
a wig.
(30) The queen of the Netherlands wears a wig.
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Thus characterised the distinction between non-presupposi-
tional and presuppositional information is a distinction in func-
tion. However, this distinction in function is linguistically realised
in the linguistic structure of sentences. In the above case the in-
formation that the Netherlands has a queen, is invoked by the
definite phrase ‘the queen of the Netherlands’. The presupposi-
tion that the Netherlands has a queen, is said to be induced by
the use of the definite article – or, put otherwise, the definite article
is a presupposition trigger.
This way of introducing the notion of presupposition shows
that the notion of presupposition as used in the literature is an
ambiguous one. We thus have to make some distinctions, and the
basic distinction that should be made is the distinction between
presupposition as information taken for granted and presupposi-
tion as induced, invoked or triggered by a linguistic expression.
The first notion is the notion of presupposition as background
information, that is information which is already given or taken
for granted in a conversation. Stalnaker (1975) and Karttunen
(1974) call it the common ground. The second notion is the notion
of presupposition as information that is conventionally associated
with linguistic expressions or syntactic constructions. Though the
two notions of presupposition are fundamentally different, there
is a straightforward connection. If a linguistic element induces a
presupposition, the sentence containing the inducing element will
typically be appropriate in a context which already contains the
presuppositional information. Thus (30) will normally be judged
appropriate or acceptable in a context in which the information
that the Netherlands has a queen is somehow established or taken
for granted. If not, one should rather convey this information in a
less compact way e.g. as in (31).
(31) The Netherlands has a queen and she wears a wig.
When saying that a sentence which contains a presupposition
inducer and thus invokes presuppositional information is
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typically be appropriate in a context which already contains this
information, I carefully added the word ‘typically’. Preservation
of presuppositionally induced information is indeed the default
but, as the literature on presupposition projection amply testifies,
there are many exceptions. Thus in the following conditional, the
consequent invokes the presuppositional information that there
is a king of France, but the whole sentence makes no suggestion
whatsoever as to the existence of such an individual.
(32) If France has a king, the king of France is bald.
Nor does (33).
(33) It is possible that France has a king and that the king of
France is bald.
In the above two cases the information that France has a king,
is introduced – in a non-presuppositional way – in respectively the
antecedent of the conditional and the first conjunct of the modal-
ized sentence. Intuitively, the presuppositional expressions link up
to the information thus introduced: they turn out to have the same
function as pronouns. Pronominalizing the descriptions in (32) and
(33) yields more idiomatic rephrasings in which the pronouns are
bound to the indefinite that serves as their antecedent. The phe-
nomenon that descriptive phases can be bound by antecedently
given antecedents is not limited to descriptive phrases but turns
out to be quite general. If we find a presuppositional expression
that depends on some previously introduced entity there is nor-
mally a more idiomatic counterpart that features anaphoric ex-
pressions that are more scantily dressed. The following illustrates
this for two other types of presupposition inducers: factive verbs
and verbs of transition.
(34) a. If the king of France is bald, his wife will regret that/
that he is bald.
b. If John used to smoke, he stopped doing so/smoking.
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Just as in (32) and (33) the relevant information is introduced at
a subordinate (but accessible) level of discourse structure, and the
presuppositional information links up to this information, just as
pronouns do.
The explanation I proposed in earlier work (van der Sandt
1992) is simple. Presupposition inducers are regular anaphoric ex-
pressions on a par with pronouns and other descriptively impover-
ished anaphors. This comprises simple and composite descriptions
like ‘the king of France’, ‘the boy who kissed all girls’ and ‘the
nanny of my neighbour’s dog’; it also comprises cleft construc-
tions, verbs of transition (begin, stop, continue), adverbs like too
and again, factive verbs (regret, be surprised, discover) and many
others. All these expressions induce information that has to be
resolved in context. More specifically, they search for an accessible
antecedent. This antecedent may be given at the main level (which
is always accessible) or at some subordinate accessible position. In
the cases just given they find their antecedents at a subordinate
level where they resolve just like regular pronouns.
In the examples (32) and (33) the accessible context contains
an explicit antecedent. The question arises what happens if this is
not the case, e.g. when we utter (30) out of the blue. One might
think that if (30) were uttered in a context in which the presuppo-
sitional information is not already established, the resolution al-
gorithm would stop and the discourse would come to a halt. This
is not what we observe, however. As Lewis pointed out ‘it is not as
easy as you might think to say something that will be unaccept-
able for lack of required presuppositions. Say something that will
be unacceptable for lack of a required presupposition, and straight
away that presupposition springs into existence, making what you
said acceptable after all’ (Lewis 1979, p. 339). This phenomenon
is known as accommodation.
If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P
to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t,
then—ceteris paribus and within certain limits—presupposition
P comes into existence at t. (Lewis 1979, p. 340)
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This brings me to the main difference between presuppositional
expressions and pronouns. In case a pronoun cannot find an an-
tecedent, the sentence will not get an interpretation for the simple
reason that the resolution algorithm does not come to an end.
However, sentences containing presupposition inducers will, under
the same condition, normally get a determinate value. The reason
is simple. Presuppositonal expressions differ from pronouns and
other impoverished anaphors in that they carry a certain amount
of descriptive information. Thus, while the presuppositional frame
of a pronoun is simply
[
x
 ]7, the information invoked by regular
presupposition inducers carries additional constraints. For exam-
ple, the presuppositional frame for ‘the queen of the Netherlands’
comes with an extra condition
[
x
queen of the netherlands(x)].8
Thus, if the incoming discourse lacks an accessible antecedent,
the descriptive content associated with the presuppositional ex-
pression will allow a cooperative recipient to establish a discourse
marker and attach the associated constraints to it; the resulting
entity may then function as an antecedent for the presuppositional
anaphor. This process also captures our intuition that (35a) is pre-
supposing: the sentence requires the presuppositional information
for its interpretation. For (35b) there is no such requirement. The
first sentence introduces, explicitly and non-presuppositionally,
the information that France has a king and thus provides an an-
tecedent – just as happens in the discourse (35c).
(35) a. The king of France is bald.
b. France has a king and the king of France/he is bald.
c. France has a king. The king of France/he is bald.
7Or, at most, an embellishment with number and gender.
8Or, at a deeper level of analysis: ∂

x
???? queen(x), of(x, y)∂ y ??the netherlands(y) 

. Note
the embedding of a presuppositional condition in another presuppositional
condition.
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The resolution of (36), the provisional DRS for (35a) illustrates
the accommodation mechanism.
(36)
[ bald(x)∂ [xkf(x)]
]
This structure resolves to (37):
(37)
[
x
kf(x), bald(x)]
Note that the the universe of the provisional DRS (37) is empty –
just as in the case of (18), the provisional DRS for its pronominal-
ized counterpart. But (36) differs from (18) in that the anaphoric
condition does not just consist of a bare variable, but comes with
the information that this variable should satisfy the condition
kf(x). The discourse referent comes about by accommodation and
during this process the associated conditions are transferred to
the level where the discourse referent is entered in the DRS, thus
establishing a proper antecedent for future anaphors to bind to.
Note, moreover, that the DRS so obtained is identical to the DRS
that would result from processing (35b) or the discourse (35c).
The output is the same, but the presuppositional (35a) which is
intuitively presupposing, differs from the other examples that this
sentence requires for its interpretation the information that there
is a king of France, whereas in the non-presupposing variants no
accommodation is called for since the relevant information is ex-
plicitly given. The current account thus simultaneously captures
the Russellian claim that all these sentences are truthconditionally
equivalent and the Frege/Strawson intuition that an utterance of
(37a) presupposes that there is a king of France.
In the last example accommodation just saved interpretabil-
ity by establishing a discourse marker for the anaphor to bind
to. To illustrate that resolution by accommodation is a very pow-
erful device if applied to presuppositional expressions in embedded
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environments, I conclude this section by illustrating the mecha-
nism with respect to the negation of (35a). The provisional DRS
is (38):
(38)
[¬ [ bald(x)∂ [xkf(x)]
]]
The negation operator creates a subDRS, which contains the pre-
suppositional anaphor. This anaphor will search along its accessi-
bility path for an antecedent to bind to, but just as in (36) it will
not find one. The discourse thus has to be saved by accommoda-
tion. The first option is the main context. Entering the discourse
marker with the presuppositional constraint at top level gives (39):
(39)
[
x
kf(x),¬ [ bald(x)]]
The description has primary occurrence to put it in the Russel-
lian way. In present day discourse this reading will be blocked
however, since it is in conflict with background knowledge. But,
given the fact that the description is at a subordinate level, there
is a second option: accommodation in the – equally accessible –
subordinate structure i.e. within the scope of the negation opera-
tor. This yields the structure where the description has secondary
occurrence:
(40)
[ ¬ [xkf(x), bald(x)]]
In short, the resolution mechanism produces the two readings Rus-
sell gets – in a purely syntactic way – by the interaction of quanti-
fiers and operators. But in the current framework we get an ad-
ditional prediction: on the reading where we accommodate the
descriptive phrase in the main context, the sentence is predicted
to presuppose that France has a king, just as Frege and Strawson
would have it.
Let us take stock. Presuppositional expressions are anaphoric
expressions on a par with pronouns and other attenuated anaphors
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and thus need to be resolved in context. This can happen in either
of two ways. Firstly, the anaphoric variable of a presuppositional
frame may be equated with some discourse marker that it can
reach along its accessibility path. If it links up to such a marker
(which will thereby serve as its antecedent), the associated condi-
tions will be attached to the binding site and the antecedent will
so inherit all descriptive material the presuppositional expression
carries. If no such antecedent can be found, the presuppositional
information will (normally) be accommodated at some accessible
level, thus creating an accessible antecedent after all.9
4. PRESUPPOSITION RESOLUTION VERSUS RUSSELLIAN
SCOPE
In an influential paper Keith Donnellan (1966) drew a distinc-
tion between the so-called attributive and referential use of de-
scriptions, and argued that Russell’s theory does not adequately
capture the referential use as exemplified by my pointing in a trial
to Jones, the murderer of Smith, and saying ‘Smith’s murderer
is insane’. In such a case, Donnellan argued, the description is
used referentially and functions as a name. We don’t assert that
there is one and only one person who murdered Smith and is in-
sane. Instead we say of this particular individual, Jones in the
present case, that he is insane. Donnellan contrasted this with the
attributive use as we find when this sentence is uttered by a de-
tective who finds Smith’s heavily mutilated body and has not yet
a clue as to who killed him. Here Russell’s analysis seems to give
the right result: we convey that there is some (unique) individ-
ual who murdered Smith and is insane. A major drawback of this
view is that it makes descriptions semantically ambiguous. I will
not go into the extensive literature on this issue but remark that
the current account when supplemented with a Kripkean view on
9‘Normally’, since the process of accommodation is constrained by various
factors which comprise consistency and various constraints of a Gricean nature.
See Van der Sandt (1992) for a detailed account.
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proper names or the Kaplanian account of indexicality, captures
the Donnellan’s distinction rather well. In the referential case the
description ‘Smith’s murderer’ links up to the (indexically em-
bellished) proper name ‘John’ and thus gets (albeit indirectly) a
referential interpretation. In the attributive case no such link is
made. The descriptive information is accommodated.
Following Donnellan it has been suggested that his distinction
can be used to account for the de re/de dicto distinction, which is
traditionally accounted for by Russellian scope. I will not go into
this issue here, but just remark with Kripke (1979) that no binary
distinction can replace the Russellian notion of scope. When opera-
tors are iterated, Russell’s account predicts intermediate readings.
And, of course, it should – as Kripke’s (41) shows:
(41) The number of planets might have been necessarily even.
Russell’s account gives three possible readings. The description
may outscope both modal operators. This yields a reading accord-
ing to which the sentence is false. Narrow scope of the description
also gives a false reading. The true reading (42) shows intermediate
scope and yields truth:10
(42) a. ♦ [ ιx.number planets(x)] even ιx.number planets(x)
b. ♦∃!x [number planets(x) ∧ even(x)]
At the end of the previous section I pointed out that the ac-
count of presupposition which views presuppositions as regular
10This paper was written in the (northern hemisphere) summer of 2006 at
sunny Brazilian beaches. After my return to the Netherlands I found out that
Pluto had been demoted to a dwarf. I nevertheless decided stick to a venerable
cultural and philosophical tradition and I thus assume, for the purposes of this
paper, that the number of planets is 9. Astrophysicists who find this offensive,
are invited go with the definition of the International Astronomic Union and
to change in this example and in the following paragraphs all occurrences of
‘even’ to ‘uneven’. This does not affect the argument.
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anaphors, gives us Russellian scope as a bonus.11 It encodes the
descriptive phrase as a standard presupposition inducer,
(43) ∂
[
x
number planets(x)]
which yields (44) as the pre-structure for (41):
(44)
[♦ [ [ even(x),∂ [xnumber planets(x)]
]]]
The anaphoric expression will look upwards along its accessibility
path and search for an antecedent to bind to. Since no such an-
tecedent will be found, the presuppositional information has to be
accommodated. The accommodation mechanism gives us – in prin-
ciple – the option of projecting the presuppositional structure to
any of the three Russellian positions (all of which are accessible).
The first option is accommodation at the top level of discourse
structure (the main context). This yields the reading according to
which the description has scope over both embedding operators.
11To prevent possible misunderstandings I want to stress that the resolution
mechanism regulates the relative scope of presuppositionally induced informa-
tion with respect to embedding operators. In the case of definite descriptions
(and other presuppositional expressions which can be analysed the same way)
this information is that there is an object that satisfies the descriptive condi-
tions. The outcome of the resolution process captures what Russell achieves
by syntactically generating scope in the description language. This is because
every type of presupposition is scope-taking in the following sense: it may – by
its capacity to accommodate at different levels of discourse structure – in its
final representation represent the presuppositional information within or out-
side the scope of embedding operators. Of course, this does not capture regular
quantifier scope as are found in e.g. ‘Every boy kissed a girl’, where the in-
definite phrase may outscope the universal quantifier (though the existential
import of the universal quantifier, i.e. the presuppositional information that
there is a (contextually given) set of boys will be scope taking in the sense ex-
plained). Here I will be totally agnostic as to the issue whether the traditional
notion of quantifiers scope should be regulated in syntax, by the Montagovian
technique of ‘quantifying in’, by some mechanism of underspecification or in
yet another way. See Geurts (1999) for a discussion of the distinction between
scope by projection and classic quantifier scope.
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(45)
[
x
number planets(x), ♦ [  [ even(x)]]]
But since background knowledge tells us that this reading is false
it will be blocked. Background knowledge will also block both the
narrow scope reading of the description. This leaves us with inter-
mediate scope. Put more succinctly, the syntactic base generates
(44) and the resolution algorithm maps it to (46):
(46)
[ ♦ [xnumber planets(x),  [ even(x)]]]
Though non-controversial examples which show intermediate
scope are ubiquitous (iteration of attitude verbs, modal operators,
logical connectives and various mixtures), there has been some op-
position to the idea of intermediate accommodation.12 Accommo-
dation – so the alternative story goes – is not a structural operation
at the level of logical form, it is a global process which takes place
at a metalevel. It is an operation which, in the face of threatening
infelicity, forces a co-operative recipient to revise his view on the
incoming context and thus modifies the global incoming context
by inserting the missing material in order to guarantee felicity af-
ter all. This view has a number of serious drawbacks, however.
The first problem is technical. It turns out to be very difficult
to explain this view in non-metaphorical terms.13 Then there is
a methodological problem. Rejection of intermediate (and local)
accommodation forces the analyst to supplement his (global) ac-
commodation mechanism with additional Russellian scope mecha-
nism to account for cases which could be handled by the projection
mechanism straight away. Ockham certainly would object.
There is a third problem, though. On the account of presuppo-
sition I just sketched, presuppositional binding and accommoda-
tion are two sides of the same coin. Presuppositional expressions
can be bound by a suitable antecedent provided that they occur
in an accessible position. And, going in the other direction, they
may accommodate an antecedent in any position from where this
12E.g. Von Fintel (1994) and Beaver (2001),
13But see Beaver’s account in terms of information sets (2001, Ch. 9.3).
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antecedent can access and thus bind the presuppositional anaphor.
Since this account is implemented in a dynamic theory of meaning
it gives an extra option. As I pointed out in the previous section,
dynamic theories allow for semantic binding from the antecedent
of a conditional into its consequent, and from the restrictor of
a quantifier into its nuclear scope. This gives an additional ac-
commodation possibility, the restrictor of a quantifier (or the an-
tecedent of a conditional), an option which was not yet available
on Russell’s account.
Examples of restrictor accommodation abound. Quine noted
as early as 1941 that (47) is to not be construed as meaning that
Tai is always eating and using chopsticks when doing so. It is more
likely to mean that whenever Tai eats he does so with chopsticks.
(47) Tai always eats with chopsticks.
As Quine puts it: the unwanted representation suggests gluttony,
the proper representation daintiness (Quine 1941, p. 91).
Many more examples are found in the literature on generics,
focus and presupposition projection. Presuppositional – and back-
grounded information in general – tends to be interpreted in the
restrictor of quantified structures as Schubert and Pelletier’s work
on generics (Schubert and Pelletier 1989) amply testifies. In (48a)
the relevant cats quantified over are cats that are somehow in the
air; the proper interpretation of (48b) does not pertain to the ma-
jority of Californians but only to the voting ones; and (48c), finally,
suggests in no way that each visitor carries a cell phone but only
applies to visitors who carry one.
(48) a. Cats always land on their feet.
b. Most Californians voted for Schwarzenegger.
c. All visitors should leave their cell phone with the se-
curity officers.
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Since (48a) and (48b) involve some additional complications in-
volving tense and focus, I illustrate the mechanism with respect
to (48c).14 The syntactic base generates (49):
(49)


[
x
visitor(x)] 〈∀x〉


leave(x, y)
∂
y

phone(y)
poss(z, y)
∂
[
z
 ]



Note that the presuppositional frame for the descriptive phrase
embeds the representation of the pronoun. The full structure re-
solves in two phases. Resolution starts with the most deeply em-
bedded anaphoric expression, i.e. ∂
[
z
 ], equates z with the quan-
tified referent x in the restrictor, thus yielding:
(50)
[xvisitor(x)] 〈∀x〉

leave(x, y)
∂
[
y
 phone(y)poss(x, y)
]
The pronoun is thus bound, but the anaphoric variable of its em-
bedder will not find a proper antecedent and thus has to be ac-
commodated. The general rule is that accommodation takes place
as high as possible, i.e. preferably in the main DRS. In the present
case this possibility is blocked since x is entered in the restrictor
and accommodating poss(x, y) at top level would leave x free in
this condition.15 We thus accommodate one level lower along its
accessibility path, entering the information in the restrictor. This
gives (51) as output:
(51)
[[x, y  visitor(x),phone(y), poss(x, y)
] 〈∀
x
〉 [leave(x, y)]]
14For an account of the focus/background distinction in the present frame-
works see Geurts and Van der Sandt (2004).
15The phenomenon is known as trapping. See Van der Sandt (1992) for
details.
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In the last example I illustrated the presuppositional mecha-
nism with respect to a dependent possessive phrase – a species of
open descriptive phrases. But, as I said before, the mechanism is
generally applicable to any kind of anaphoric expression. So let me
conclude with a perhaps unexpected example – tense. In (52) the
temporal information, which is syntactically induced in the nuclear
scope of the quantificational adverb, ends up in the restrictor.
(52) Floppy was always on the run.
Again, this is readily explained if we adopt Partee’s (1973) sugges-
tion that verb tenses should be treated as a kind of pronoun. In
the present framework this comes down to encoding the tense mor-
pheme as a presuppositional expression consisting of an anaphoric
variable and an associated temporal constraint. Assuming that
the main DRS contains an indexical constant n for the moment of
utterance, the future tense is represented as follows:
(53) ∂
[
t
t < n]
The syntax thus generates (54b) for (54a):
(54) a. Floppy was on the run.
b.
[ flop run(t),∂ [tt < n]
]
Combining this with
[
t
 ] 〈∀
t
〉 [ ], the frame for the presupposi-
tional adverb yields (55) as the pre-structure for (53):
(55)
[
n
[t ] 〈∀t〉 [ flop run(t′),∂ [t′ t′ < n]
]]
Note that the temporal information is encoded in the place where
it syntactically originates. However, in the course of the resolution
process the temporal information percolates upwards along its ac-
cessibility path. But, after being bound by the quantified variable,
it is intercepted in the restrictor resulting in (56):
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(56)
[
n
[tt < n] 〈∀t〉 [flop run(t)]]
This keeps syntax as simple as possible. For just like other presup-
positional information temporal information is generated in situ,
i.e. the place where we syntactically find it (normally the morphol-
ogy of the verb). The phenomenon that verb tenses tend to link
up to contextually given temporal locations and the tendency to
take wide scope in case no prior temporal information is given, are
accounted for by its anaphoric nature.
The data thus require projection of presuppositional mater-
ial to various non-global levels. The data are moreover easily and
most economically accounted for when we adopt the principle that
presuppositional material tends to flow upwards – generally as high
as constraints on binding and accommodation allow. On this ac-
count definite phrases behave just like any other species of the
multifarious family of presupposition inducers.
One final point should be made. The reader will have noticed
that, when encoding descriptive phrases, I left out the unique-
ness condition. Let me first remark that an orthodox Russellian
has no choice. In Russell’s original framework the only difference
between indefinites and definites is that the latter come with an
additional uniqueness condition. Thus, when the uniqueness re-
quirement were left out, the distinction between definites and in-
definites would collapse. When we look at the functioning of de-
scriptive phrases in actual discourse the uniqueness assumption is
highly problematic, however. More often than not a descriptive
phrase succeeds in singling out a unique individual even if the de-
scriptive material actually satisfies many other individuals. This
happens in particular when the descriptive phrase carries only a
small amount of semantic information.
(57) Yesterday Mary saw a man and a woman. The man was
wearing a red shirt.
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This mini-discourse is clearly felicitous in a setting in which there
are many other male individuals around besides the one mentioned
in the first sentence of (0). An orthodox Russellian is thus forced
to take the descriptive phrase as somehow elliptical for ‘the man
Mary saw yesterday’ or, if Mary met yesterday – not implausibly –
other men as well, as elliptical for ‘the man Mary saw yesterday
and who . . . ’ On the current account it would, technically, be no
problem to add a uniqueness requirement to the presuppositional
frame of a descriptive phrase. But, as the example just given il-
lustrates, such an addition would, observationally, be most unwel-
come. Moreover, since on the current account descriptive phrases
function as embellished pronouns there is no need to do so. The
resolution mechanism will link anaphoric variable of the descrip-
tion to the discourse referent established for the man mentioned
in the first sentence and thus single out the intended individual.
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